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RELATIONAL THEORY AND CHOICE 





The issue of personal choice has become central to Canadian family 
law. Much of the debate derives from the competing models of 
autonomy posited by neoliberal and feminist theorists. Neoliberalism, 
which currently dominates Canadian public discourse, views 
individuals as atomistic agents who can and should make 
“responsible” choices. However, feminists have highlighted the effects 
of structural barriers and social context on personal decision-making, 
particularly for women, and have advanced alternative relational 
autonomy models. These models are particularly appropriate to family 
law, but their application to family financial ordering has not been 
widely considered. This article discusses the practical significance of 
a relational autonomy approach in the context of spousal support 
(maintenance) and property agreements, focusing on the jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court of Canada from 1987 to date. However, while 
the article centres on Canadian law, it also speaks to the broader 
debate on autonomy and fairness in family law generally. The article 
asks two core questions: First, to what extent has relational theory 
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informed the Court’s decisions on spousal support and marital 
property agreements? Second, do or would relational understandings 
make a practical difference in spousal support and marital property 
agreement cases? The article traces the evolution of autonomy theory 
in the Court’s decisions on marital property and spousal support 
agreements. It contends that the Court has gradually adopted a 
largely, though not consistently, relational approach. This approach 
may not always make as much practical difference as some feminists 
might expect. Nevertheless, the article argues that a relational 
approach may be vitally significant in some cases. Consequently, the 
article concludes that it would be regrettable if so-called “choice 




What does it mean to make a meaningful choice in a family context? 
Should individuals be held to agreements and decisions made in 
difficult personal circumstances or under significant social pressures? 
These questions have become central to Canadian family law, where 
there has been a continuing debate on the significance and the nature 
of personal choice. Much of the debate derives from the competing 
models of autonomy posited by neoliberal and feminist theorists. 
Neoliberalism, currently the dominant ideology in Canadian public 
discourse,1 views individuals as atomistic, independent agents, who 
have the ability, and the duty, to make “responsible” decisions in their 
own best interests. Feminists, by contrast, have highlighted the effects 
of structural barriers and social context on personal decision making. 
They have also emphasized the structural implications of what 
Williams has termed the “rhetoric of choice,”2 where negative 
                                                 
 
1 See e.g. Alexandra Dobrowolsky, ed, Women and Public Policy in Canada: 
Neo-liberalism and After? (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
[Dobrowolsky, ed]. 
2  Joan Williams, “Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice” 
(1991) 66 NYUL Rev 1559 at 1561. The phrase “choice rhetoric” is 
subsequently used by Gillian Calder, “The Personal Is Economic: Unearthing 





consequences are deemed to flow from “personal choice,” without 
further interrogation of that “choice” or its gender implications. 
However, feminists are also concerned with vindicating women’s 
agency. To reconcile these apparently opposing objectives—the 
vindication of choice and the recognition of constraints on the exercise 
of that choice—feminists have offered a range of alternative autonomy 
models. Broadly described as “relational,”3 these models focus on the 
social situation of the individual (including the social connections and 
pressures that may affect personal decision making), and the impact of 
social forces on the development of personal capacities for reflection 
and action.  
 
The “choice” debate is particularly resonant in the context of 
prenuptial agreements and divorce settlements, which commonly 
restrict property or support entitlements. However, although the 
emphasis of relational theory on caring obligations and social 
connections is particularly relevant to family law,4 the application of 
relational models to financial ordering within the family has received 
surprisingly little attention.5 The most sustained analysis to date in the 
Canadian context has been offered by Robert Leckey, who has 
                                                 
 
the Rhetoric of Choice in the Canadian Maternity and Parental Leave Benefit 
Debates” in Rosemary Hunter & Sharon Cowan, eds, Choice and Consent: 
Feminist Engagements with Law and Subjectivity (New York: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007). 
3  See e.g. Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds, Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) at 4. 
4  Jonathan Herring, “Relational Autonomy and Family Law” [Herring] in Julie 
Wallbank, Shazia Choudhry & Jonathan Herring, eds, Rights, Gender and 
Family Law (New York: Routledge, 2010) at 259. 
5  For two exceptions, see Penelope E Bryan, “Women's Freedom to Contract at 
Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion” (1999) 47 Buff L Rev 1153 
[Bryan, “Women’s Freedom”] and Robert Leckey, “Contracting Claims and 
Family Law Feuds” (2007) 57 UTLJ 1 [Leckey, “Contracting Claims”]. 





considered the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on adult 
couples in the light of relational theory.6 This paper further explores 
the application of relational theory in the spousal agreement context, 
focusing on spousal support (maintenance) and property agreements.7 
It engages particularly with Leckey’s critique, concurring with some 
aspects of his case analysis and disagreeing with others, and extending 
the analysis to subsequent decisions. However, while Leckey has 
argued that the self-sufficient, rational, “choosing” subject of liberal 
theory has now been supplanted by the contextualized legal subject in 
Canadian family law, this paper argues, inter alia, that this transition 
is still highly contested, and that liberal and neoliberal 
conceptualizations of the subject continue to compete with more 
relational understandings, even in contextualized judicial discourse. 
 
While the article focuses on Canadian law, the analysis offered 
is of wider relevance. The article speaks to the broader debate on 
autonomy and fairness in family law, particularly as it applies to 
prenuptial and postnuptial agreements. It especially recalls the tensions 
evidenced by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of England and 
Wales in Radmacher v. Granatino,8 in which the majority’s emphasis 
on respecting autonomy contrasted with the dissent’s highlighting of 
the gender equality implications of upholding prenuptial agreements.9 
The article is also pertinent to current proposals for the legal 
                                                 
 
6  Leckey, “Contracting Claims”, supra note 5; Robert Leckey, Contextual 
Subjects: Family, State, and Relational Theory (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008) [Leckey, Contextual Subjects]. 
7  Other terms of marital agreements, such as those relating to child custody and 
support, are not specifically addressed in this paper, though obviously they 
may be connected to financial and property issues. 
8  [2010] UKSC 42, [2011] 1 AC 534. 
9  For a detailed analysis of the decision in Radmacher, see Lucy-Ann Buckley, 
“Ante-nuptial Agreements and Proper Provision: An Irish Response to 
Radmacher v Granatino” (2011) 14:1 Irish Journal of Family Law 3. 





recognition of prenuptial agreements in jurisdictions such as England 
and Wales and Ireland.10  
 
The paper focuses on two core research questions. First, to 
what extent have understandings drawn from relational autonomy 
theory informed the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada on 
spousal support and marital property agreements? Second, do or would 
relational understandings make any practical difference in spousal 
support and marital property agreement cases? The article begins by 
briefly summarizing neoliberal conceptualizations of autonomy and 
the principal feminist critiques. It explains relational autonomy theory 
and examines how a relational approach might apply to family 
agreements. It outlines key features of the Canadian law of marital 
property and spousal support and highlights relevant aspects of the 
broader legal and ideological context. It then traces the evolution of 
autonomy theory in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada 
on marital property and spousal support agreements from 1987 to 
date.11 Finally, the article evaluates the degree of practical difference 
                                                 
 
10  The Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements, LAW 
COM No 343, (London: Stationery Office, 2014); Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform, Report of the Study Group on Pre-nuptial 
Agreements (Dublin: Government Publications, 2007). 
11  The article focuses on judgments of the Court between 1987 and May 2014 
relating to prenuptial or postnuptial agreements dealing with property division 
or spousal support. The year 1987 was significant because some of the original 
leading cases relating to financial autonomy were heard in that year: Pelech v 
Pelech [1987] 1 SCR 801; Caron v Caron [1987] 1 SCR 892; Richardson v 
Richardson [1987] 1 SCR 857 [the Pelech trilogy]). Cases were identified from 
the judgments listed on the Supreme Court of Canada’s website. Cases 
analyzed were: Pelech v Pelech [1987] 1 SCR 801; Caron v Caron [1987] 1 
SCR 892; Richardson v Richardson [1987] 1 SCR 857; G (L) v B (G) [1995] 3 
SCR 370; Boston v Boston [2001] 2 SCR 413, 2001 SCC 43; Miglin v Miglin 
[2003] 1 SCR 303, 2003 SCC 24; Hartshorne v Hartshorne [2004] 1 SCR 
550, 2004 SCC 22; Rick v Brandsema [2009] 1 SCR 295, 2009 SCC 10; LMP 
v LS [2011] SCJ No 64, [2011] 3 SCR 775 (SCC); RP v CP [2011] SCJ No 
65, [2011] 3 SCR 819 (SCC). Most cases concerned the weight to be accorded 





that a relational approach can make and contends that, quite often, it 
may make less difference than many feminists might expect. This may 
be because of the way that cases are presented (which in turn may 
depend on structural and other factors) or because situations may offer 
a range of relational narratives and much depends on which narrative 
is preferred by the court. However, the article also contends that there 
are cases in which a relational approach may make a very significant 
difference. It therefore concludes that it would be highly regrettable if 
so-called “choice rhetoric” were to displace the relational 
understandings which, it argues, have been at least partially espoused 
by the Court.  
 
AUTONOMY: NEOLIBERAL CONCEPTIONS AND 
FEMINIST CRITICISMS 
 
In classical liberal theory, individuals are atomistic agents of their own 
good, possessing a self-determined moral identity12 and motivated by 
self-interest. This conceptualization also accords with the “rational 
choice” theory of neoclassical economics.13 Since decisions motivated 
                                                 
 
to such agreements in subsequent divorce proceedings or in applications to 
vary the agreed provision, though one case concerned the validity of the 
agreement itself. The article does not analyze the variation of previous non-
consensual orders (such as spousal support orders), as the focus is on 
autonomy rather than the variation of support as such. Owing to space 
restrictions, only the most relevant cases are discussed in the article, with 
relevance determined by the significance of the case for the analysis of 
autonomy. 
12  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 at 5. 
13  Laura T Kessler, “Is There Agency in Dependency? Expanding the Feminist 
Justifications for Restructuring Wage Work” in Martha A Fineman & Terence 
Dougherty, eds, Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005) at 384. 





by self-interest are considered more likely to be efficient,14 state 
intervention with agreements should be minimized.15 The 
liberal/neoclassical economic model therefore serves both to justify the 
status quo and to preclude intervention.16 
 
This understanding is deeply embedded in the prevailing 
neoliberal model.17 Philosophically, neoliberalism valorizes 
individualism, choice, responsibility, and self-sufficiency.18 This 
valorization is reflected in both the private and public spheres: as 
Lessard notes, neoliberalism differs from classical liberalism due to the 
merger of social and economic relations.19 Hence, “market principles 
are internal to both the state and society,”20 and “market-inspired 
imagery also shapes neo-liberal conceptions of the citizen.”21 
Furthermore, “choice” is not simply a good in itself; nor is it limited to 
freedom from state control. Rather, it is “the marker of the responsible 
                                                 
 
14  Marcia Neave, “Private Ordering in Family Law—Will Women Benefit?” in 
Margaret Thornton, ed, Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) at 165. 
15  Linda Mulcahy, Contract Law in Perspective, 5th ed (New York: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2008) at 26. 
16  Neil H Buchanan, “Playing with Fire: Feminist Legal Theorists and the Tools 
of Economics” in Fineman & Dougherty, supra note 13 at 85. 
17  For a more detailed account of neoliberalism, see Alexandra Dobrowolsky, 
“Introduction: Neo-liberalism and After?” [Dobrowolsky, “Introduction”] in 
Dobrowolsky, supra note 1; Rachel Treloar & Susan B Boyd, “Family Law 
Reform in (Neoliberal) Context: British Columbia’s New Family Law Act” 
(2014) 28 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 77 at 79.  
18  See Dobrowolsky, “Introduction”, supra note 17 at 6. 
19  Hester Lessard, “Charter Gridlock: Equality Formalism and Marriage 
Fundamentalism” (2006) 33 SCLR 291 at 300. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid at 301. 





individual,”22 as the individual can, and should, choose to act in a self-
sufficient way, befitting the “active citizen” of neoliberal discourse.  
 
In the family context, neoliberalism reinterprets conduct based 
on relational values (such as love and altruism) in the language of 
rationality and self-interest.23 It also privatizes welfare considerations, 
including caring responsibilities. Families are essentially expected to 
be both self-governing and self-sufficient, rather than relying on state 
support. However, the tensions between personal and family self-
sufficiency are disregarded. This has particular consequences for 
women, who are assumed to be active labour market participants, while 
simultaneously expected to be the primary familial care-providers.24 
These gendered outcomes are, however, obscured by neoliberalism’s 
emphasis on formal equality and the gender-neutral framing of legal 
and policy measures, which (in practice) constrain women’s real 
autonomy and freedom of choice25 while ignoring and maintaining 
their systemic disadvantage.26 In this way, “choice rhetoric” reinforces 
                                                 
 
22  Ibid at 312. 
23  Ibid at 301. For a discussion of the inappropriateness of applying exchange 
values to family situations, see Ann Laquer Estin, “Love and Obligation: 
Family Law and the Romance of Economics” (1995) 36 Wm and Mary L Rev 
989 at 1018. Estin also contends that decision making may be based on 
emotional rather than economic rationality: ibid at 1018. 
24  Treloar & Boyd, supra note 17 at 79. For a more detailed discussion of the 
public policy significance of privatizing caring work, see Susan B Boyd, 
“(Re)Placing the State: Family, Law and Oppression” (1994) 9 CJLS 39 at 69; 
Martha A Fineman, “Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, 
Autonomy, and Self-sufficiency” [Fineman] in Fineman & Dougherty, eds, 
supra note 13. 
25  Treloar & Boyd, supra note 17 at 80. 
26  Dobrowolsky, “Introduction”, supra note 17 at 14. For instance, gender-based 
labour market discrimination may seriously affect women’s economic 
independence, resulting in unequal bargaining power: see e.g. Neave, supra 
note 14 at 167; Susan M Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989) at 147. Women may also be seriously disadvantaged by 





the gendered division of labour, while disguising how the costs of 
childrearing and caring work are generally allocated to women.27 
 
Feminists also criticize the neoliberal failure to consider social 
context and social relations. Far from being atomistic, independent 
actors, humans are unavoidably interdependent and connected to 
others,28 particularly in the family context. This interdependency 
restricts the options realistically open to the socially connected 
individual,29 particularly where religious or cultural pressures apply.30 
Feminists further emphasize the constitutive nature of social relations, 
arguing that personal identities are inevitably informed by social 
norms, traditions, and expectations.31 Accordingly, socialization 




                                                 
 
domestic violence: see e.g. Neave, supra note 14 at 169 and Hunter & Cowan, 
supra note 2 at 158. 
27  See Fineman, supra note 24 at 184; Calder, supra note 2 at 130, citing 
Williams, supra note 2 at 1596; and Rebecca Johnson, “If Choice is the 
Answer, What is the Question? Spelunking in Symes v. Canada” in Dorothy 
E Chunn & Dany Lacombe, eds, Law as a Gendering Practice (Ontario: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) at 199. 
28  Paula England, “Separative and Soluble Selves: Dichotomous Thinking in 
Economics” in Fineman & Dougherty, supra note 13 at 32. 
29  See Herring, supra note 4 at 267; Margaret F Brinig, “Some Concerns about 
Applying Economics to Family Law” in Fineman & Dougherty, supra note 
13 at 455. 
30  Examples of this might include parental pressure to marry or cultural pressure 
to permit family issues to be dealt with by a religious court. 
31  Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women” in 
Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 at 35. 
32  Ibid. 





FEMINIST ALTERNATIVES: RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
 
These criticisms cause serious difficulties for feminists. How can 
recognition of the constitutive nature of social forces be reconciled 
with autonomy?33 And how can women be protected from the 
oppression arising from restricted choices but allowed to retain 
agency?34 One response is to deny that social conditioning precludes 
agency; for instance, Barclay contends that autonomy does not require 
complete freedom from external or social influences, even if this were 
possible. Instead, she suggests that the point of autonomy is not to 
evade externalities, but to be able to “fashion a certain response” to 
them through reflective engagement.35 However, many feminists go 
further, arguing that autonomy should be reconceived to take account 
of relational values. Mackenzie and Stoljar propose “relational 
autonomy” to take account of the fact “that persons are socially 
embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of 
social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social 
determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.”36 All of these 
factors necessarily affect agency, either in the formation of preferences 
or the development of the personal capacities required for autonomy or 
in restricting action through social or cultural norms.37 More simply, as 
Llewellyn and Downie put it, “The central question. . . is not so much 
                                                 
 
33  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 at 13; Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: 
A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 53.  
34  Gillian K Hadfield, “An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist 
Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law” 
(1998) 146 U Pa L Rev 1235 at 1236. 
35  See e.g. Linda Barclay, “Autonomy and the Social Self” in Mackenzie & 
Stoljar, supra note 3 at 54. 
36  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 at 4. 
37  Ibid at 22. 





‘what is X in relationship to or with?’ but, rather, ‘what is the effect of 
being in relation?’”38 
 
Proponents of relational autonomy emphasize that individuals 
are emotional and feeling as well as rational,39 and that this affects their 
decision making. However, accepting relational autonomy creates 
other difficulties, particularly where someone makes a “choice” that is 
objectively “bad” for herself, or which conflicts with her personal 
wishes, but which she perceives as necessary for relational reasons 
(such as ensuring her children’s well-being, sustaining a relationship, 
or remaining within her community). Immediate priorities may require 
choices that are ultimately oppressive.40 Refusing to respect such 
choices undermines agency, yet upholding them may reinforce not 
only personal but collective gender inequality. There is therefore a risk 
that “community” needs or wishes may too easily override those of the 
individual, reinforcing traditional feminine social or cultural roles.41 
This difficulty is compounded where oppressive social norms are 
internalized, so that an individual may not even contemplate alternative 
possibilities.  
 
Feminist responses to this dilemma may be classified as 
“procedural” or “substantive.” An individual is procedurally (or 
formally) autonomous if she has reflected appropriately on her 
                                                 
 
38  Jennifer J Llewellyn & Jocelyn Downie, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on 
Relational Theory and Health Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 4. 
39  Ibid at 21. 
40  Carolyn McLeod & Susan Sherwin, “Relational Autonomy, Self-trust, and 
Health Care for Patients Who Are Oppressed” in Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra 
note 3 at 261. 
41  Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) at 128. 





thoughts and wishes, irrespective of the nature of those wishes.42 
Hence, as Stoljar notes, “preferences for dependence and connection 
can be autonomous,” thus permitting diversity.43 The chief difficulty 
with a procedural view is that it overlooks the socialization processes 
that affect the formation of beliefs, desires, capacities, and attitudes, 
which are an essential aspect of self-examination.44 This difficulty is 
addressed by “substantive” theories, whereby an individual is not 
autonomous if socialization inhibits her capacity to analyze critically 
an internalized norm.45 Alternatively, substantive theories restrict in 
some way the preferences that an autonomous individual may hold (for 
instance, by reference to normative criteria).46 “Substantive” theories 
may be criticized for their reliance on normative standards (which may 
not be universal) or because their emphasis on psychological capacity 
may still permit oppression.47 
 
                                                 
 
42  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 at 13; Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and the 
Feminist Intuition” [Stoljar] in Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 at 94. 
43  Stoljar, supra note 42 at 95. 
44  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 at 13; Susan J Brison, “Relational 
Autonomy and Freedom of Expression” in Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 
at 284. 
45  Stoljar, supra note 42 at 95. 
46  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 3 at 19-20. Mackenzie and Stoljar distinguish 
between “weak” and “strong” substantive theories of autonomy. A “weak” 
substantive approach requires further conditions to be satisfied, beyond 
procedural aspects, before an agent can be deemed autonomous. These might 
include a sense of self-worth or confidence in one’s own judgment. “Strong” 
substantive approaches go further and impose restrictions on the kinds of 
preferences that autonomous agents can hold. This is because they commonly 
require “normative competence” (ibid at 20), that is, individuals must be able 
to “discern the false norms accepted and perpetuated by the oppressive context 
in which they are operating” (ibid at 21). 
47  Ibid at 21. For example, an agent might trust her own judgment, yet make 
choices based on internalized, oppressive norms. 





Although the conceptualizations of individual relational 
theorists differ, Leckey has identified three common elements to their 
overall approach, which provide a useful reference point for legal 
analysis. First, the individual is identified as “relationally embedded,” 
rather than atomistic. Second, a contextual methodology is adopted, 
which focuses not only on the personal situation of the individual but 
also considers the broader social, economic, political, and cultural 
context. Third, there is a “normative commitment to relational 
autonomy and to promoting constructive relationships conducive to it,” 
since only this permits critical evaluation of the law.48 The significance 
of these elements for marital agreements will be considered below. 
 
Relational Autonomy and Marital Agreements 
 
Autonomy is relevant to marital agreements in two ways. First, where 
a spouse was not acting autonomously, the court may set an agreement 
aside for duress, undue influence or unconscionability. However, each 
doctrine has particular requirements (sometimes legislatively 
modified), which may prove difficult to satisfy.49 Second, the weight 
                                                 
 
48  Leckey, “Contracting Claims”, supra note 5 at 9-10. 
49  Duress traditionally requires the application of pressure to such a degree that 
no true consent is given by the pressured party. However, the pressure of 
difficult circumstances is insufficient here, as is fear or subordination arising 
from a historically abusive relationship. Undue influence arises where one 
person exerts an unusual degree of dominion over another, which is sufficient 
to negate the independent will and judgment of that other and which enables 
the dominant party to obtain an unfair advantage. However, quite apart from 
the fact that the relationship of husband and wife does not raise a presumption 
of undue influence, the doctrine does not address power disparities, pressures, 
and unequal bargaining power arising from other causes, such as economic 
inequality. Potentially the most useful doctrine is that of unconscionability, 
whereby a court can set aside a contract in equity if the parties had unequal 
bargaining power (such that one party was unable to protect her interests 
adequately), with the result that the more powerful party obtained an undue 
advantage or benefit. The question here is to what degree a person’s 
bargaining ability must be affected before the court will intervene, and what 





that the court accords to a marital agreement under family law 
legislation may be reduced by a perception of unfair pressure, 
disadvantage, or exploitation, even where this is insufficient to set the 
agreement aside under the law of contract. Relational theory may 
therefore either expand traditional doctrines, or explain why an 
otherwise valid agreement should be accorded less weight in family 
law. 
 
Drawing on the common elements identified by Leckey, a 
relational approach to autonomy emphasizes the social situation of the 
actors and the context in which the bargaining occurred. This 
highlights discrepancies in the parties’ bargaining positions, as well as 
the emotional concerns and vulnerability arising in the prenuptial and 
marital breakdown contexts and the pressures arising from abusive 
relationships or concern for children. It highlights the implications of 
structural inequalities (such as gender inequality in the market place 
and in caring work) for individual decision making. The relational 
approach also acknowledges the social constitution of individuals and 
the significance of broader social context (such as the cultural location 
of the subject). All of these offer potential grounds for contesting the 
neoliberal assumption of atomistic self-interest. However, while 
relational theory stresses the significance of relationships and context 
in respect of personal decision making, it also holds that individuals 
can move beyond those contexts and shape their own lives, rather than 
simply accepting social roles and definitions.50 Hence, although 
relational theory emphasizes the role of emotion and interdependency 
in personal decision making, it does not suggest that either emotion or 
emotional pressure precludes autonomy. Indeed, as Leckey has argued, 
women might be pathologized by assumptions of emotionalism and 
                                                 
 
factors will be taken into account in assessing this. For a discussion of all three 
doctrines, see Raymond J Friel, The Law of Contract (Dublin: Round Hall 
Press, 1995) ch 18. 
50  Nedelsky, supra note 33 at 47. 





vulnerability.51 From a relational perspective, emotion is an essential 
aspect of humanity that may actually enhance the quality of decision 
making by promoting altruism, empathy, and connection. Emotion can 
be empowering, particularly in contexts of support and concern. 
Emotions such as fear may indeed undermine autonomy, but emotional 
pressure does not necessarily vitiate an individual’s decision-making 
capacity, since capacity is a continuum, with a wide range between 
competence and incompetence.52 Although relational theory rightly 
emphasizes the potential effects of exploitation and relational pressure, 
thereby promoting greater insight into the nature of oppression,53 it also 
permits individuals to prioritize relational over economic concerns.  
 
How does relational autonomy respond if a spouse or intending 
spouse makes an agreement that is financially disadvantageous or 
manifestly unequal? An obvious focus is on procedural concerns (such 
as whether adequate independent advice was available). Substantive 
approaches are also possible, though some are problematic. One 
substantive approach might incorporate normative equality standards, 
so that unequal agreements, or agreements which deviate significantly 
from statutory entitlements based on equality principles, would be 
deemed non-autonomous. However, this precludes diversity and 
undermines freedom of choice, since individuals may forego their 
statutory entitlements for compelling reasons.54 Although “choice 
rhetoric” is clearly open to abuse, it does not follow that “bad” choices, 
even those made in “bad” circumstances, are invariably non-
autonomous. A second substantive response might derive from 
Leckey’s emphasis on the promotion of “constructive relationships.” 
                                                 
 
51  Leckey, “Contracting Claims”, supra note 5 at 13. 
52  Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 193. 
53  Llewellyn & Downie, supra note 38 at 6. 
54  For example, individuals may wish to provide for their children or to obtain a 
clean break or may feel guilty for the breakdown of their marriage. 





Here one might uphold decisions taken for what might be termed 
“positive” relational reasons (for example, decisions influenced by 
considerations of altruism, concern, and love), while decisions based 
on “negative” relational factors (such as fear or psychological 
domination) might be impugned as “non-constructive.” Such 
distinctions might be difficult to draw in practice, particularly since 
even loving relationships may be (unconsciously) exploitative, while 
empowerment may exist even within apparently negative situations. A 
third possibility, preferred here, would be to hold that individuals must 
be able to reflect critically on equality norms, even if they ultimately 
depart from them, and must feel that they have a real choice in how 
they respond to a particular situation. This encourages a consideration 
of a broader range of factors than those traditionally legally recognized 
as potentially negating volition,55 and suggests an increased level of 
scrutiny where an agreement made in emotional or pressured 
circumstances seems particularly one-sided, without however adopting 
any presumption of non-autonomy. This would permit both diversity 
and responsiveness to the particular context, consistent with relational 
methodology and would also, as Leckey notes, ensure that the weaker 
party, as well as the stronger, can reasonably rely on agreements.56  
 
In summary, relational theory requires us to be aware of 
relational issues, pressures, and context when considering whether 
                                                 
 
55  The law has traditionally focused on extreme factors negating volition (such 
as duress in the form of threats to life or of bodily harm): see Michael 
Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 15th ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 384. However, coercion and 
pressure in the marital breakdown context may be more subtle than this. 
Threats may be made regarding a child or access; a non-earning spouse may 
be financially desperate; legal advisors or supposedly neutral mediators may 
apply pressure to reach agreement on particular terms: see Bryan, “Women's 
Freedom”, supra note 5 at 1237. Furthermore, emotional distress, such as that 
arising on the marital breakdown, has not traditionally been recognized by the 
courts as negating legal capacity (ibid). 
56  Leckey, “Contracting Claims”, supra note 5 at 19.  





someone acted autonomously. However, it also suggests that 
economically “irrational” behaviour may be “rational” in a particular 
context, so that “bad” agreements are not necessarily non-autonomous. 
It is suggested here that relational theory offers a more profound and 
detailed contextual examination of autonomy, which goes much further 
than traditional legal doctrines in its examination of pressure and 
capacity, yet which still recognizes and maintains the role of contract 
and permits diverse choices where individuals have real reflective 
capacities.  
 
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY IN CANADA 
 
To what extent has relational autonomy established a place within the 
Canadian case law, and does or would it make a difference within the 
decided cases? The remainder of this article examines the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in light of these questions. However, 
prior to evaluating the case law on marital agreements, it is worth 
highlighting some significant structural and ideological features of the 




Canada distinguishes between marital property and spousal support, 
and the legislative aspects of each are separate.57 This duality may be 
significant for the conceptualization of autonomy. Marital property is 
governed by provincial law,58 usually through equal-sharing regimes; 
several provinces have also enacted sharing regimes for unmarried 
                                                 
 
57  Marital property and spousal support may be interrelated in practical terms, as 
property entitlements may affect the appropriateness or quantification of 
spousal support. 
58  Sections 92(13) and (16) of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 
3, reprinted in Appendix II, No 5, confer jurisdiction over “property and civil 
rights” and “matters of a merely local or private nature in the province” on 
provincial government. 





cohabitants (“de facto spouses”).59 Spousal support on divorce is 
governed by federal law,60 and support is also available under 
provincial or territorial legislation, outside of the divorce context (e.g. 
on separation). In addition, the laws of all provinces other than Quebec 
provide for spousal support for unmarried cohabitants. 
 
In theory, default marital sharing regimes should enhance the 
bargaining power of the economically weaker spouse in financial 
negotiations, as parties bargain “in the shadow of the law.”61 This 
suggests that systemic gender disadvantage in marital property 
bargaining should be less prevalent in Canada than in systems with less 
defined entitlements. This may encourage greater deference to marital 
property agreements, and in fact spouses (or intending spouses) may 
generally derogate from the applicable marital property regime.62 
However, most Canadian provinces mandate some judicial oversight 
of marital property agreements, either on fairness grounds or on 
contractual or autonomy-related grounds.63  
                                                 
 
59  See e.g. s 3 of the Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25; Law Reform 2010 Act, 
SNS 2000, c 29. 
60  The federal Parliament has constitutional jurisdiction over marriage and 
divorce (s 91(26) of the Constitution Act 1867, supra note 58), and this has 
been interpreted to include corollary (or ancillary) relief. 
61  Robert H Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce” (1979) 88 Yale LJ 950. 
62  The exception to this general rule is Quebec, where spouses cannot contract 
out of the primary regime (art 391 CCQ, CQLR c C-1991). 
63  Some provinces have expanded the grounds on which agreements may be set 
aside as invalid. In Ontario, an agreement can be set aside for inadequate 
disclosure, failure to comprehend the nature or consequences of the contract, 
or otherwise under the law of contract (Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F-3, s 
56(4)). Agreements in Nova Scotia may be set aside if they are 
“unconscionable, unduly harsh on one party or fraudulent” (Matrimonial 
Property Act, RSNS 1989, c 275, s 29). British Columbia previously permitted 
courts to adjust agreements in the interests of fairness (Family Relations Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 128, s 65(1)), thus according less weight to a (valid) agreement 






Spousal support on divorce is discretionary and is governed by 
the federal Divorce Act 1985.64 The Divorce Act lists factors for 
consideration in evaluating spousal support claims65 and specifies 
objectives for such support.66 Spousal support is based on 
considerations of need, contract, and compensation,67 leading to an 
uneasy balance between the recognition of social realities and an 
egalitarian emphasis on individual responsibility and choice.68 
Although guidelines have been introduced on the quantification of 
                                                 
 
on policy grounds. However, it has now adopted a more restrictive approach: 
Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 93. 
64  Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp). The spousal support rules of 
particular provinces are outside the scope of this article. 
65  Divorce Act, supra note 64 s 15.2(4). Relevant factors include the spouses’ 
“condition, means, needs and other circumstances” (ibid). 
66  Divorce Act, supra note 64 s 15.2(6). The objectives for spousal support are 
the recognition of economic disadvantage arising from the marriage or its 
breakdown, the apportionment of the financial consequences of child-rearing 
(over and above child support), relief from economic hardship resulting from 
marital breakdown, and the promotion of each spouse’s economic self-
sufficiency within a reasonable timeframe insofar as is possible (ibid). 
67  Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420 [Bracklow]. 
68  Eichler notes that the “individual responsibility” model of the family operative 
in Canada is based on the egalitarian assumption that both parents are equally 
capable of fulfilling, simultaneously, both the economic and the caring role 
within the family, and should therefore be equally responsible for doing so, if 
required: Margrit Eichler, Family Shifts: Families, Policies, and Gender 
Equality (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 13. This precludes 
public assistance, or, indeed, long-term spousal support.  





support69 and have had a significant impact in this context,70 the 
guidelines have no statutory basis and do not address the issue of 
entitlement. From an autonomy perspective, the absence of fixed 
support entitlements means that women lack bargaining endowments 
in this context, except insofar as the guidelines create parameters for 
the quantification of support in practice, where support is deemed 
appropriate.71 Furthermore, the importance of spousal support in 
addressing the long-term economic consequences of a marriage may 
only become apparent over time, so that spouses negotiating on support 
issues may find it difficult to make informed decisions.72 Courts may 
therefore approach support agreements more cautiously than property 
agreements. Conversely, the spouses’ inability to exclude the court’s 
jurisdiction under the Divorce Act73 may encourage the enforcement of 
                                                 
 
69  Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines 
(Department of Justice Canada, 2008) [SSAG]. 
70  Carol Rogerson, “Child and Spousal Support in Canada: The Guidelines 
Approach Part 2” (2012) 15:1 IJFL 18 at 24 [Rogerson, “Child and Spousal 
Support”]. 
71  Rogerson considers that clearer support entitlements “would change the 
dynamics of bargaining”: Carol Rogerson, “Miglin v. Miglin 2003 SCC—
They Are Agreements Nonetheless” (2003) 20 Can J Fam L 197 at 228 
[Rogerson, “Miglin v. Miglin”]. However, she has emphasized that the SSAG 
do not determine entitlement to spousal support, but merely give a range for 
the appropriate amount, as a starting point for discussion: Rogerson, “Child 
and Spousal Support”, supra note 70 at 25. Even so, she has recently 
suggested that “[t]he SSAG give spousal support recipients stronger 
bargaining chips and spousal support is not so quickly being taken off the 
bargaining table as it was in the past”: Carol Rogerson, “Spousal Support 
Agreements and the Legacy of Miglin” (2012) 31 Can Fam LQ 13 at 44 
[Rogerson, “Spousal Support Agreements”]. 
72  Rogerson, “Spousal Support Agreements”, supra note 71 at 20. 
73  Miglin, supra note 11. 





marital property agreements, since spousal support will (theoretically) 
still be available to alleviate need.74  
 
Ideological Background   
 
The broader political and ideological context in Canada must also be 
considered. The rise of neoliberalism in Canada is well documented.75 
This is significant for legal analysis because neoliberalism clearly has 
implications for legal decision making, as well as for political, 
economic, and social policy. Although Canada subscribes to an 
egalitarian model of the family and particularly emphasizes gender 
equality, its focus on “individual responsibility” (as described by 
Eichler)76 renders it vulnerable to neoliberal encroachment. From a 
family law perspective, one would expect neoliberal theory to generate 
decisions emphasizing formal equality rather than systemic 
disadvantage, social relations, or context. One would also expect 
rulings limiting access to state support, applying more traditional and 
conservative understandings of marriage and family relationships, and 
(in the context of family agreements and arrangements) emphasizing 
personal responsibility and choice.77 All of this renders the feminist 
critique of neoliberalism particularly apposite in the Canadian context. 
                                                 
 
74  In practice, spousal support awards have been comparatively rare: see Julien 
D Payne & Marilyn A Payne, Canadian Family Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2008) at 223 [Payne & Payne].  
75  See e.g. Dobrowolsky, ed, supra note 1; Lessard, supra note 19 at 297; Treloar 
& Boyd, supra note 17; Janine Brodie, “We Are All Equal Now: 
Contemporary Gender Politics in Canada” (2008) 9 Feminist Theory 145. 
76  For a general discussion of models of the family and their implications, see 
Eichler, supra note 68, ch 1. Canada’s commitment to an egalitarian model 
(described by Eichler as an “individual responsibility” model) is expressed in 
section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982  (UK), 1982, 
c 11, which expressly refers to gender equality. 
77  In fact, many of these phenomena have been identified in the literature: see 
e.g. Lessard, supra note 19; Alexandra Dobrowolsky, “Charter Champions? 





However, even if neoliberalism now dominates political 
discourse, it does not follow that judicial decisions will automatically 
or consistently apply neoliberal principles. Neoliberal practice is often 
contradictory, particularly in the gender context.78 These discrepancies 
may be partly attributable to the process of political transformation, 
where one dominant mode of “truth-telling” is gradually displaced by 
another, with neither dominating in the transitional period.79 
Furthermore, neoliberalism is not a monolithic force, but can be 
applied differently in different contexts.80 Hence, variation remains 
possible, and even likely,81 particularly since the effects of changes in 
the policy framework may take time to manifest in different “policy 
realms.”82 This is significant in the legal sphere, where judges 
appointed in a particular political or ideological climate may only 
gradually be replaced.83 Hence, contemporaneous judicial decisions 
may appear contradictory in emphasis and approach, depending on the 
constitution of the court, and courts may split along ideological lines.84 
                                                 
 
Equality Backsliding, the Charter, and the Courts”, ch 10 [Dobrowolsky, 
“Charter Champions?”] in Dobrowolsky, ed, supra note 1; Lois Harder, 
“Intimate Relationships and the Canadian State” ch 9 in Dobrowolsky, ed, 
supra note 1. 
78  Brodie, supra note 75 at 148. 
79  Ibid at 148, citing John Clarke, “Subordinating the Social? Neo-liberalism and 
the Remaking of Welfare Capitalism” (2007) 21 Cultural Studies 974. 
80  Dobrowolsky, “Introduction”, supra note 17 at 2. 
81  Ibid at 3. 
82  Ibid at 16. 
83  See Dobrowolsky, “Charter Champions?” supra note 77 at 217 for a 
discussion of significant changes in the constitution of the Supreme Court of 
Canada and their political and ideological ramifications. However, as 
discussed below, the constitution of the Court is not necessarily as significant 
for analytical purposes as might be expected. 
84  For example, describing the Canadian courts’ response to equality claims 
under the Charter, Dobrowolsky notes that “there was a lag in neo-liberal 





Nevertheless, as Brodie notes, “political rationalities . . . privilege 
specific vocabularies, styles of truth-telling and truth-tellers.”85 Hence, 
claims framed in the language of “choice” and “personal 
responsibility” may receive a more sympathetic hearing than 
arguments premised on “equality” or “fairness.” Combined with an 
insistent assumption of gender equality, this may render courts 
skeptical of claims based on gender discrimination or systemic 
disadvantage.86 
 
Against this background, it is unsurprising that a brief survey 
of the broader case law of the Supreme Court of Canada in recent years 
suggests that autonomy and choice are recurring judicial concerns, and 
that the views expounded are often strongly, though not exclusively, 
neoliberal in tone.87 For instance, the recent decision in Kerr v. 
Baranow evidences a strong emphasis on choice and autonomy 
concerns in the unjust enrichment context.88 Cromwell J. emphasized 
that people might deliberately choose not to marry and their intentions 
in this regard must be given “considerable weight” in determining 
whether they intended to embark on a “joint family venture.”89 
However, although this aspect of the judgment accords with 
neoliberalism, Cromwell J. also emphasized the need to look at how 
                                                 
 
consolidation and the right-wing critique did not immediately take hold, nor 
did it have the intended blanket effect.” Gradually, however, in response to 
shifts in public discourses, “Neo-liberal justifications . . . crept into court 
decisions.” Dobrowolsky, “Charter Champions?” supra note 77 at 207. 
85  Brodie, supra note 75 at 147. 
86  Brodie, supra note 75 at 160; Dobrowolsky, “Charter Champions?” supra 
note 77 at 215. 
87  This article does not purport to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions outside of the context of spousal property and 
support agreements. 
88  2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 SCR 269. 
89  Ibid at para 94. 





the parties “have actually lived their lives,”90 suggesting a more 
relational approach. He also noted that conduct could demonstrate a 
concern for the family as a whole, including personal sacrifice in the 
family interest.91 This clearly recognizes that decision making is not 
always motivated by self-interest, though Cromwell J. makes no 
reference to the relational or structural pressures that might also 
apply.92 Thus, even though some of the issues highlighted by the 
feminist relational critique do feature in the judgment, the overall tenor 
is broadly consistent with neoliberal ideology.93 
 
Neoliberal “choice” concerns are also evident in equality 
decisions under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,94 
notably in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh,95 which upheld 
the exclusion of unmarried spouses from Nova Scotia’s matrimonial 
property regime.96 Bastarache J., for the majority, emphasized that 
people can choose whether to marry and that this choice should be 
respected; the marital property regime can only be imposed on those 
                                                 
 
90  Ibid at para 88. 
91  Ibid at paras 93, 98. 
92  Cromwell J. makes a brief reference to “encouragement” to detrimental 
reliance (ibid at para 99), but otherwise makes no reference to relational 
pressures. 
93  For a more detailed critique of the neoliberal aspects of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in Kerr, see Jennifer Flood, “Share the Wealth? Kerr v 
Baranow and the ‘Joint Family Venture’” (2011) 27 Can J Fam L 361. 
94  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
95  Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh [2002] SCJ No 84, [2002] 4 SCR 325 
[Walsh]. 
96  The majority held that marriage is a valid difference for the purpose of 
drawing distinctions, and the case may also be analyzed in terms of its 
conservative approach to family relationships: see Lessard, supra note 19 at 
306. 





who choose to be subject to it.97 This approach is clearly consistent 
with the neoliberal shift in the Canadian polity. However, the dissent 
of L’Heureux-Dubé J. must also be noted. She highlighted that, for 
many cohabitants, the choice of one party to marry is denied by the 
(often exploitative) choice of the other not to do so,98 reiterating her 
previous comments in Miron v. Trudel.99 This illustrates the conflicting 
ideological approaches that may co-exist, and which feature in many 
of the decisions on family agreements. 
 
Most recently, the Court has revisited the issue of choice in 
Attorney General of Quebec v. A.,100 in which, as in Walsh, the plaintiff 
challenged the constitutionality of a provincial marital property regime 
that excluded unmarried partners.101 Although the case centred on the 
test for unlawful discrimination under section 15 of the Charter, the 
Court spent considerable time discussing the importance of autonomy 
and respect for personal choice. This emphasis was most apparent in 
the judgment of LeBel J.,102 who held that the marital regime could 
                                                 
 
97  Walsh, supra note 95 at para 48. Bastarache J. considered that this approach 
“enhances rather than diminishes respect for the autonomy and self-
determination of unmarried cohabitants and their ability to live in 
relationships of their own design” (ibid at para 50). 
98  Ibid at para 153. 
99  [1995] SCJ No 44, [1995] 2 SCR 418.  
100  2013 SCC 5 [Quebec v A]. 
101  Walsh was particularly relevant in Quebec v. A., since it too concerned the 
exclusion of common law spouses from a provincial property-sharing regime 
(in that case, Nova Scotia). The lower courts in Quebec v. A. therefore felt 
bound by Walsh. Abella J., however, for the majority, felt that it was 
appropriate to conduct the section 15(1) analysis “untethered by Walsh” 
(supra note 100 at para 347), as the Court’s equality analysis had since 
“evolved substantially” (ibid at para 338). 
102  Speaking for the minority on section 15, though for the plurality on the 
outcome. 





only be imposed on those who had demonstrated a wish to be subject 
to it, that this consent must be explicit, and that it must be demonstrated 
by marriage or a civil union. This is because individuals are free to 
choose different types of conjugal relationships, and to “shape their 
relationships as they wish.”103 While conceding that “individuals 
sometimes make uninformed choices” and might “be unaware of the 
consequences of their choice of conjugal lifestyle,”104 the court could 
not take judicial notice of this. LeBel J. took a classic liberal view of 
autonomy, construing choice in terms of freedom from state 
interference, rather than positive empowerment.105 Notwithstanding 
the plaintiff’s claim that the assumption of autonomy did not conform 
to her reality,106 LeBel J. concluded that the plaintiff “chose to live with 
[the respondent] in a conjugal relationship without making marriage a 
precondition to their cohabitation.”107  
 
By contrast, Abella J.108 emphasized the complex, nuanced and 
potentially illusory nature of “choice,” echoing the recognition in 
                                                 
 
103  Quebec v A, supra note 100 at para 114. 
104  Ibid at para 274. 
105  Ibid at para 139. 
106  Ibid at para 36. 
107  Ibid at para 45. Although the plaintiff’s claims are not described in detail in 
the judgments, it is possible to identify significant inequalities, which might 
well have impacted on how the relationship played out. There was a 15-year 
age gap between the parties, who met while the plaintiff was still at school; 
there was a vast gulf in the parties’ economic situations; the plaintiff was 
living far away from her home country and family; the plaintiff became 
pregnant when the parties were living apart, and it was only after this that 
cohabitation resumed. For a more detailed account of the facts, see Martin 
Patriquin, “A Billionaire, the Law, His Brazilian Ex: The Stormy Breakup that 
May Redefine Marriage in Canada” Maclean’s (19 February 2009) online: 
<www.macleans.ca/news/canada/a-billionaire-the-law-his-brazilian-ex/>. 
108  Giving the majority judgment on section 15, though in the minority regarding 
the outcome. 





Miron that theoretical freedom to marry may be constrained in practice 
by factors beyond the individual’s control.109 Likewise, McLachlin 
C.J.110 referred to a “false stereotype of choice” rather than “the reality 
of the claimant’s situation.”111 Both Abella J. and McLachlin C.J. held 
that the failure to marry did not reflect the plaintiff’s autonomous wish 
to avoid Quebec’s marital regime.112 The strong differences in 
approach in Quebec v. A. demonstrate both the fraught nature of the 
autonomy debate and the significance of the underlying ideological 
paradigms. 
 
Analysis of Marital Property and Spousal Support Agreement 
Cases  
 
Against this background, what do the analyzed cases say about 
autonomy in the marital property and spousal support contexts? Given 
the different structural considerations that apply, this article 
distinguishes between spousal support and marital property agreement 
cases. However, this distinction is not rigid, as courts hearing property 
                                                 
 
109  Supra note 100 at para 316. Abella J.’s judgment primarily focused on 
demonstrating how family property reforms in Quebec had subordinated 
spousal choice to the protection of economically vulnerable spouses. 
110  Concurring with Abella J. on section 15, though with the plurality regarding 
the outcome. 
111  Quebec v A, supra note 99 at para 423. 
112  However, it should be noted that McLachlin C.J., unlike Abella J., ultimately 
held that the discriminatory effects of the legislation were justified by the 
legislative objective of promoting choice and autonomy with regard to 
property division and support (ibid at para 435); hence, the plaintiff ultimately 
lost her case.  





agreement cases have drawn on spousal support cases,113 though not 
always felicitously.114  
 
Weight accorded to support agreements 
 
Although the support provisions of the Divorce Act cannot be 
excluded, the Act places considerable emphasis on agreement.115 
Section 9(2) obliges legal practitioners “to discuss with the spouse the 
advisability of negotiating” support and custody matters and to inform 
spouses of known mediation facilities.116 However, a separation 
agreement is simply a matter for “consideration” for the court.117 In 
practice, significant weight is likely to be attached to a support 
agreement, although a court may vary an agreement where the parties’ 
circumstances have changed and it is just to do so.118  
 
Although the predominant emphasis in the case law has been on 
upholding agreements, the jurisprudence shows a considerable evolution. 
In the earliest decisions examined for this article, the so-called Pelech 
trilogy (Pelech, Richardson and Caron),119 the spouses had agreed on 
spousal support with the benefit of legal advice. In all three cases the 
wife subsequently sought, unsuccessfully, to vary the agreement. The 
Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the importance of respecting 
agreements and held that a support agreement or waiver could only be 
overridden if there was a causal connection between the need for 
                                                 
 
113  For example, in Hartshorne, supra note 11 (discussed below), both the 
majority and the minority judgments drew on Miglin, supra note 11. 
114  Rogerson, “Spousal Support Agreements”, supra note 71 at 28. 
115  Supra note 64. 
116  Ibid.  
117  Ibid, s 15.2(4)(c). 
118  Ibid, s 15.2, 17. 
119  Supra note 11. 





support and the marriage, together with a radical change in 
circumstances. 
 
The Pelech approach was widely criticized as too restrictive,120 
and subsequently, in Miglin v. Miglin,121 the Supreme Court held that 
it no longer applied. Under Miglin, the key question is whether, at the 
time of application, the total circumstances make it unacceptable to 
uphold the agreement. A change in circumstances is part of this overall 
evaluation, rather than essential in itself.122 The Court stressed that 
some changes in circumstances could always be expected; only if there 
was a significant discrepancy between the parties’ expectations and 
their present circumstances should the court significantly discount the 
agreement.123  
 
In Miglin, the spouses signed a separation agreement containing 
(inter alia) a full and final release of spousal support. The wife 
subsequently obtained a spousal support order under the Divorce Act, 
which was overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada on appeal. 
Applying a two-tier approach, the Supreme Court held that the court 
should first consider whether the agreement should be discounted for 
unfairness in the negotiation process, such as exploitation of one 
party’s vulnerability, or because it failed to comply substantially with 
the general objectives of the Divorce Act. The court should then 
consider whether, at the time of the support application, the agreement 
still reflected the parties’ original intentions and still complied 
substantially with the statutory objectives of certainty, finality, 
                                                 
 
120 See e.g. Colleen Sheppard, “Uncomfortable Victories and Unanswered 
Questions: Lessons from Moge” (1994) 12 Can J Fam L 283 at 289; Martha J 
Bailey, “Pelech, Caron, and Richardson” (1990) 3 CJWL 615 [Bailey, 
“Pelech, Caron, and Richardson”]; Carol Rogerson, “The Canadian Law of 
Spousal Support” (2004) 38 Fam LQ 69 at 78. 
121  Supra note 11. 
122  Ibid at para 63. 
123  Ibid at paras 8889. 





agreement, and equitable sharing.124 While the court would not simply 
“endorse any agreement, regardless of the inequities it reveals,”125 it 
would not “unduly” interfere with “agreements freely entered into and 
on which the parties reasonably expected to rely.”126 Accordingly, 
although the dissent expressed strong views to the contrary,127 it 
appears that statutory fairness objectives alone may not override other 
policy considerations.128 On the facts, neither party was particularly 
vulnerable during the negotiations. Both had had extensive and expert 
legal and financial advice. The negotiations were not rushed or 
pressured, and the agreement was “sophisticated”129 and 
“exhaustive.”130 The majority decided that the agreement was fair, both 
when concluded and at the time of application, and should be upheld. 
 
If the Pelech trilogy represents the high point of enforcing 
agreements, Miglin represents an uneasy compromise between the desire 
to uphold bargains and the recognition that agreements may be unfair or 
exploitative. However, its exact application continues to be debated and 
                                                 
 
124  Ibid at para 4. 
125  Ibid at para 43. 
126  Ibid. 
127  In Miglin, the dissent considered that a support agreement could be overridden 
if it was objectively unfair at the time of the application; for policy reasons, 
agreements should reach a threshold of fairness before they are upheld (ibid 
at para 228).  
128  In the previous case of G (L) v B (G), supra note 11 [G (L) v B (G)], the court 
considered that the weight accorded to an agreement would vary depending, inter 
alia, on the degree to which it took account of the statutory objectives, particularly 
that of equitable sharing: para 56. However, the court also emphasized the need 
for finality and personal responsibility (ibid para 55), so that the cases are not 
necessarily inconsistent. 
129  Miglin, supra note 11 at para 12. 
130  Ibid at para 14. 





evolve.131 Following an extensive review of the post-Miglin case law, 
Rogerson found that the courts initially interpreted the ruling strictly, 
as meaning that agreements should be upheld unless there were very 
serious flaws in the negotiation process.132 Little attention was paid to 
overall substantive fairness or compliance with the statutory 
objectives, and many unfair agreements were upheld.133 However, 
Rogerson found that the courts gradually became more concerned with 
both substantive and procedural fairness and more reluctant to uphold 
agreements that departed significantly from the norms of the Divorce 
Act.134 
 
Miglin’s emphasis on upholding agreements has arguably been 
further eroded by two recent decisions, L.M.P. v. L.S.135 and R.P. v. R.C.136 
Both decisions addressed the weight to be accorded to spousal support 
agreements which were incorporated into support orders in subsequent 
applications to vary those orders.137 In L.M.P., the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that there is no statutory obligation to consider prior 
agreements in this context.138 Applications to vary support orders are 
made under section 17 of the Divorce Act, while applications for 
spousal support, such as the application in Miglin, are made under 
                                                 
 
131  See e.g. the detailed analysis of Rogerson, “Spousal Support Agreements”, 
supra note 71. 
132  Ibid at 14. 
133  Ibid. 
134  Ibid at 20. 
135  Supra note 11 [LMP]. 
136  Supra note 11 [RP]. 
137  Rogerson notes that Miglin was not actually relevant in either case, as the 
spousal support agreements in each case, though open-ended, did not 
expressly purport to be “final.” See Rogerson, “Spousal Support 
Agreements”, supra note 71 at 62. 
138  LMP, supra note 11. 





section 15.2. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the 
principles applicable under each section are different, as section 17, 
unlike section 15.2, does not list prior agreements as a factor for 
consideration.139 Under section 17, the only question is whether there 
was a “change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances” 
of either former spouse since the making of the last order, which would 
probably have resulted in different terms if the change had been known 
or contemplated at the time.140 This is because the previous order (and 
any incorporated agreement) is presumed to have complied, when 
made, with the objectives of the Divorce Act. The same principles were 
applied in R.P., with the result that the support orders in both cases 
were upheld, since no material change of circumstances was 
established in either case. 
 
The decisions in L.M.P. and R.P. substantially reduce the 
significance of spousal agreements that have been incorporated into 
consent support orders.141 Notwithstanding the contrary views 
expressed by Cromwell J. in L.M.P.,142 it appears that an agreement is 
only relevant in section 17 applications to the extent that it addresses 
the issue of what should amount to a material change in circumstances 
or clarifies what was in the parties’ contemplation at the time of the 
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agreement.143 The majority noted that “even significant changes” in 
circumstances might not be “material” for variation purposes “if they 
were actually contemplated by the parties by the terms of the order at 
the time of the order.”144 However, a mere statement that the agreement 
was intended to be final could not exclude the application of section 
17, any more than it could exclude the application of section 15.145 
 
Despite these restrictions, the parties’ autonomy is not totally 
undermined, as the court will only consider varying the order (and 
hence the agreement) if the threshold of a material change in 
circumstances is met. Even then, the court will only consider what 
variation is merited by the change in circumstances; it will not consider 
the entire matter de novo. Finally, since the Court emphasized that 
Miglin remained good law,146 a spousal agreement that has not been 
incorporated in a support order may still be considered in support 
applications under section 15. 
 
Weight accorded to marital property agreements 
 
Two important Supreme Court of Canada decisions dealing with marital 
property agreements with implications for autonomy occurred within the 
analyzed time-frame. The first, Hartshorne v. Hartshorne,147 dealt with the 
interpretation of British Columbia law on marital property agreements. 
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The second, Rick v. Brandsema,148 centred on whether a separation 
agreement was unconscionable, and hence whether it was valid at all. 
  
Hartshorne involved a prenuptial contract. The intending 
spouses, Robert and Kathleen, cohabited for some years. Both were 
lawyers, but Kathleen left her employment to care for their first child. 
Shortly before their wedding, Robert required Kathleen to sign a 
prenuptial agreement as a condition of marriage. The agreement permitted 
Kathleen to accrue a share in the family home but otherwise preserved the 
spouses’ separate property entitlements. Kathleen received legal advice 
that the agreement would probably be set aside as grossly unfair under 
British Columbia law. Nevertheless, she signed it, after obtaining some 
relatively minor amendments stating that she signed the agreement against 
her will and preserving her right to spousal support. On divorce, Kathleen 
argued that the agreement should be set aside on common law 
principles or alternatively that the distribution of assets should be 
reapportioned because the agreement was unfair under the British 
Columbia Family Relations Act 1996.149  
 
The trial judge held that there had been no duress, coercion, or 
undue influence, and that the agreement was not unconscionable. 
However, it was unfair under British Columbia law because it did not 
compensate Kathleen for giving up her career. This finding was upheld 
by the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which 
emphasized Kathleen’s time out of the workforce, limited work 
experience, lack of human capital, and childcare responsibilities. 
However, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
contract was not unfair. Although the court could intervene where an 
agreement operated unfairly at the time of distribution, it must respect 
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the parties’ private agreements where they were properly negotiated 
with the benefit of independent legal advice. Where, as here, the 
parties’ circumstances on separation accorded with their reasonable 
expectations at the time of the agreement, and the agreement made 
adequate arrangements to cater to those circumstances, the agreement 
should be upheld. The court briefly acknowledged “systemic 
problems,” but emphasized that the immediate concern was “fairness 
between the parties” rather than broader concerns of gender equality.150 
The evaluation of fairness had to encompass the parties’ 
perspectives,151 and the court should not interfere unless the parties 
failed to consider the effects of their decision “in a rational and 
comprehensive way.”152 
 
Hartshorne was widely criticized for its apparent prioritization 
of reliance over fairness.153 However, Hartshorne does not mean that 
marital property agreements will invariably be upheld. Rick v. 
Brandsema154 centred on whether a separation agreement should be 
upheld where the husband knowingly exploited the wife's mental 
instability and deliberately concealed or undervalued assets to reduce 
the “equalization payment” due to her under British Columbia law. 
Nancy, the wife, subsequently claimed that the agreement should be 
set aside as unconscionable or, alternatively, that it was unfair under 
British Columbia law and should be varied. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that spouses in separation negotiations had a duty 
to avoid exploitative behaviour.155 Where exploitation results in an 
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agreement that significantly departs from the statutory objectives, the 
agreement may be unenforceable due to unconscionability.156 Since 
spouses’ ability to make proper decisions depends on the provision of 
complete and accurate information, seriously inadequate disclosure 
may also justify judicial intervention.157  
 
The Supreme Court drew particularly on Miglin, stating that it 
“represented a reformulation and tailoring of the common law test for 
unconscionability to reflect the uniqueness of matrimonial 
bargains.”158 However, as Leckey and Rogerson have argued, this 
seems to misrepresent Miglin. Miglin concerned the significance of a 
spousal support agreement when a court was exercising its discretion 
to order support under the Divorce Act; the focus was therefore on how 
fairness concerns should be balanced with autonomy and finality in the 
light of legislative policy. The court might accord less weight to an 
agreement that was tainted by pressure or exploitation, even if it was 
not unconscionable. Rick, however, concerned the enforceability of a 
property agreement at common law, so that it is difficult to see how a 
Miglin approach could be appropriate; if an agreement is void, there is 
nothing for the court to enforce. Rick therefore appeared to blur family 
law legislation with common law and equitable theory, irrespective of 
the very different contexts of spousal support and property 
agreements.159 Accordingly, Rogerson contends that Rick is best 
interpreted as drawing on some of the concepts in Miglin to refine the 
doctrine of unconscionability, rather than as applying the Miglin 
principles directly to property agreements.160 
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What do the Cases Tell Us about the Supreme Court’s 
Interpretation of Autonomy?  
 
Again, it is necessary to differentiate between spousal support and 
property agreements, as the Court’s approach to autonomy appears 
mutable.  
 
Autonomy in the spousal support context 
 
The view of autonomy presented in Canadian Supreme Court decisions 
on spousal support agreements has evolved considerably, although the 
court’s conceptualization appears still to be in a state of flux. The 
strongest expression of the neoliberal view of autonomy is found in the 
Pelech trilogy, perhaps mirroring the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s. 
Giving the majority judgment in Pelech, Wilson J. emphasized the 
need to respect the parties’ agreement, where it was freely negotiated 
and not legally unconscionable, as this would encourage personal 
responsibility.161 Personal decision making was preferable to court-
imposed solutions, and upholding agreements was essential to 
encourage settlement. Autonomy was also a good in itself; enforcing 
agreements showed respect for the individual, whereas fairness-based 
intervention was arguably paternalistic. Pelech was also strongly based 
on the policy objectives of encouraging self-sufficiency and a “clean 
break,” both of which fit well with neoliberal autonomy concepts.162 
Although the Court adverted on several occasions to structural issues 
(without however discussing how these might impact on autonomy as 
opposed to fairness and gender equality), the majority concluded that 
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excessive judicial surveillance could ultimately prove counter-
productive in addressing such concerns.163 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s most detailed discussion of 
autonomy in the spousal support context is contained in Miglin, where 
the court’s approach appears radically different to that in the Pelech 
trilogy.164 Noting that an agreement might be vitiated due to 
oppression, pressure, or other vulnerabilities, the Court held that there 
was no need to establish “unconscionability” in the commercial law 
sense of the term when considering how much weight to accord a 
support agreement under the Divorce Act.165 The Court emphasized the 
“unique environment” of marital breakdown negotiations, where 
“emotional turmoil” could render the parties vulnerable and unable to 
make “rational economic decisions.”166 Feelings of guilt, depression, 
or anger might be exacerbated by “potential power imbalances” in the 
marital relationship, and these might affect the negotiations even 
without deliberate exploitation.167 The court should therefore “be alive 
to the conditions of the parties, including whether there were any 
circumstances of oppression, pressure, or other vulnerabilities.”168 
However, the court rejected any presumption of unequal bargaining 
power, and emphasized that professional advice might counteract 
vulnerabilities.169  
 
                                                 
 
163  Pelech, supra note 11 at para 80 (per Wilson J). 
164  However, as Rogerson notes, it took some time for this aspect of the decision 
to have an impact on the case law: Rogerson, “Spousal Support Agreements”, 
supra note 71 at 20. 
165  Miglin, supra note 11 at para 82. 
166  Ibid at para 74. 
167  Ibid at para 75. 
168  Ibid at para 81. 
169  Ibid at para 82. 





The dissent in Miglin went significantly further, emphasizing 
that autonomy is affected by situational differences and established 
patterns of interaction170 as much as by obvious power imbalances and 
exploitation. It particularly stressed the significance of “social 
context”171 and the “importance of recognizing the degree to which 
social and economic factors may constrain individuals’ choices at the 
bargaining table.”172 It also emphasized the “complicated and gender-
based interdependencies” that often arise during marriage and cannot 
be addressed by formal equality or individualistic doctrines.173 
Furthermore, it noted that women generally have less bargaining 
strength than men due to financial dependency.174 Because the parties’ 
economic and family roles (which are largely gendered) can affect the 
negotiating process,175 and because even independent advice might not 
prevent inequality,176 excessive deference to separation agreements is 
inappropriate.  
 
The dissent in Miglin clearly draws on feminist criticisms of 
neoliberal autonomy, incorporates relational approaches, and goes 
considerably further than the majority in its emphasis on and analysis 
of relational pressures, power imbalances, and contextual nuances. 
Indeed, it is possible to characterize the majority judgment as 
essentially a modified form of neoliberalism, reaffirming the 
presumption of autonomy even in the face of emotional distress and 
potential imbalances of power, particularly where suitable independent 
advice was provided. Hence, despite the “unique nature” of separation 
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agreements, they were “contracts nonetheless,” for which parties “must 
take responsibility.”177 However, it is also arguable (and is argued here) 
that the majority’s approach is sufficiently nuanced and alive to 
contextual considerations to fall within the relational camp; the 
theoretical differences between the majority and minority seem to be 
in degree rather than fundamental conceptualization.178 
 
Autonomy and marital property agreements 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has attached relatively little weight to 
the emotional pressures applicable in the prenuptial context. The Court 
did not explicitly analyze autonomy in Hartshorne, since its focus there 
was on the interpretation of the fairness provisions in British Columbia 
law. Nevertheless, its understanding of autonomy is implicit in the 
majority judgment of how prenuptial agreements should be treated. 
 
The majority in Hartshorne presented a narrative whereby the 
contract unilaterally prepared by the intended husband, with minimal 
final amendments by the intended wife, was construed as a freely-
negotiated agreement that represented the wishes of both parties. The 
parties had received independent legal advice and were not under 
duress, coercion, or undue influence. The emotional context and power 
imbalance between the parties were effectively screened out. 
Accordingly, and in contrast to Miglin, Hartshorne essentially 
presented a neoliberal view of autonomy. While fair agreements were 
to be encouraged, the court emphasized that where parties “take 
personal responsibility for their financial well-being,” the judiciary 
“should be reluctant to second-guess the arrangements on which they 
reasonably expected to rely.”179 The emphasis is on self-determination 
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and reliance and the language chosen reflects this; the court felt that 
the parties’ agreement should be respected as they had “truly 
considered the impact of their choices,”180 and any intervention must 
be “in light of the personal choices made.”181  
 
Although the dissent also focused on fairness, Deschamps J. 
considered that the circumstances of the negotiation required 
“increased scrutiny” of the agreement.182 While Kathleen was not so 
vulnerable as to render the agreement unconscionable, there was 
enough to suggest possible unfairness.183 Kathleen was financially 
dependent on Robert, the agreement was concluded in pressurized 
circumstances immediately prior to the wedding, and there was an 
imbalance of power within the relationship.184  
 
Leckey has argued that both the majority and minority in Miglin 
and Hartshorne speak in relational terms; that is, they “explicitly adopt 
a contextual method and sharply distinguish the scenario of negotiating 
spouses from commercial settings,” while also emphasizing the 
importance of “individual choice.”185 He contends that “differences 
arise at the point of subjecting the facts to a contextual methodology 
and normative principles that are more or less shared.”186 He concedes 
that “[u]nmodified references to choice and autonomy pepper the 
majority judgments” in Miglin and Hartshorne and that this suggests 
“a thin, atomistic subject disengaged from its relationships.”187 
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However, he argues that “the majority and dissenting reasons in Miglin 
and Hartshorne demonstrate convergence upon crucial elements of 
relational theory. Those points on which the judges disagree are 
internal to relational theorists’ concerns.”188 
 
This view, while sustainable in relation to Miglin, seems 
inapposite to Hartshorne. It is true that the majority in Hartshorne 
adopted a contextual analysis, but the analysis is limited and 
constrained by atomistic assumptions, and omits a truly “relational” 
perspective. For instance, Kathleen’s decision to give up her job to care 
for the couple’s children was repeatedly characterized by the majority 
as personal “choice,”189 and she was assumed to have understood and 
accepted the consequences of what she had “chosen.”190 But why did 
Kathleen make this choice, and where was Robert in the decision-
making process? Kathleen’s “choice” necessarily depended on 
Robert’s support. Furthermore, one of the children had special needs 
(something not mentioned by the majority); how did this affect 
Kathleen’s decision to remain at home? It is surely incorrect to suggest, 
as the dissent does, that Kathleen’s decision to remain at home 
indicates an unequal power dynamic;191 she may have been happy to 
adopt a caring role, may have believed it was “right,” or may simply 
have believed that it was necessary, given her child’s needs. Relational 
autonomy should allow her to make this decision, provided she can 
reflect critically on the issue. However, relational autonomy also holds 
that the context in which the decision was made is relevant and should 
not be simply screened out, so that the decision and its consequences 
are automatically attributed to “personal choice.” Although Leckey 
argues that the majority “is aware of the complex emotional dynamics” 
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and “simply draws a different conclusion than do the dissenting judges 
and some critics,”192 there is no evidence of this in the judgment. 
 
The repeated use of “choice rhetoric” is highly suggestive in 
terms of how the court conceptualized broader autonomy issues. The 
majority attributes an unrealistic level of mutuality to the parties’ 
financial arrangements, implicitly assuming that separate bank 
accounts were a matter of mutual agreement and satisfaction.193 Yet 
Robert was the sole earner and clearly the controlling party in terms of 
making financial arrangements. Likewise, the fact that Kathleen signed 
the agreement is taken to imply that it represented her wishes and 
understanding of fairness, even though the agreement explicitly stated 
otherwise. The majority emphasized that if Kathleen “truly believed” 
that the agreement was “unacceptable,” she should not have signed 
it.194 This ignores the relational aspects of the decision-making process, 
including the clear power imbalance between the parties.195 None of 
this is to suggest that the agreement should not be upheld. The point is 
that the contextual discussion actually ignores or misrepresents 
significant aspects of the context, which contained sufficient 
indications of vulnerability (as the dissent put it) to suggest potential 
unfairness and warrant additional scrutiny.196 The Court’s reluctance 
to engage with these concerns may be due to what Rogerson describes 
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as its “commitment to the value of upholding spousal agreements,”197 
bolstered by an interpretation of Miglin that focuses on that decision’s 
general presumption of spousal autonomy, rather than its emphasis on 
potential power disparities and recognition of vulnerabilities. 
 
Rick presents an interesting contrast with Hartshorne. This 
may be due to the fact that Rick dealt with a separation agreement rather 
than a prenuptial contract, since the Supreme Court of Canada 
emphasized the “singularly emotional negotiating environment” and 
“uniquely difficult context” of marital breakdown.198 This context 
mandated particular care to ensure that the negotiations were “free 
from informational and psychological exploitation.”199 Rick stressed 
the potential vitiation of autonomy by inadequate disclosure, noting 
that disclosure “anchors the ability of separating spouses to genuinely 
decide for themselves what constitutes an acceptable 
bargain.”200 Accordingly, “full and honest disclosure” prima facie 
implies informed consent.201  
 
Rick is significant for the Supreme Court of Canada's 
reaffirmation of the broader approach to vulnerability taken in relation 
to separation, if not prenuptial agreements, and also for its 
acknowledgement of potential bargaining inequalities and power 
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disparities in spousal relations and the marital breakdown context.202 
In this respect, the Court arguably drew on the more relational aspects 
of Miglin.203 However, the court was careful to emphasize that the mere 
presence of vulnerabilities would not necessarily undermine an 
agreement.204 The decision is also important for its clarification of the 
significance of independent legal advice in this context. The Court of 
Appeal had concluded that the wife’s access to professional advice 
(though she did not take it) was sufficient to counteract her 
vulnerability.205 This clearly re-asserted the traditional narrative of 
autonomy and volition over that of context and vulnerability. However, 
the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that it could not be assumed 
“that the mere presence of professional assistance automatically 
neutralized vulnerabilities.”206 
 
A Paradigm Shift?  
 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding overarching 
ideological trends from so few cases. Taken at face value, the cases on 
both spousal support agreements and marital property agreements 
suggest a movement from a neoliberal model of autonomy to a more 
relational perspective. In relation to spousal support, this is evidenced 
by the differences between the early Pelech trilogy and the later 
decision in Miglin, while in relation to property, there is a clear 
difference in the model of autonomy applied in Hartshorne and that 
underlying Rick.  
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However, it cannot be said that there is a clear, overall shift 
from neoliberal to relational views within the Court207—for instance, 
(neoliberal) Hartshorne was decided a year after (relational) Miglin.208 
Nor can the different paradigms be explained simply by reference to 
the constitution of the Court,209 as the approaches of individual judges 
vary considerably. For example, the majority judgments in Hartshorne 
and Miglin were both given by Bastarache J., and four of the concurring 
judges in Hartshorne also concurred in Miglin. Even if Miglin is better 
construed as based on modified neoliberalism, this does not explain 
why two of the concurring judges in (neoliberal) Hartshorne also 
concurred subsequently in (relational) Rick. This apparent 
inconsistency is mirrored in the broader case law. For instance, in the 
constitutional context, McLachlin C.J. took a neoliberal perspective in 
Walsh and Hodge, but not in Miron, while in Quebec v. A. her relational 
approach to the nature of choice contrasted with her ultimate emphasis 
on the legislative goal of maximizing respect for autonomy in general, 
which led her to uphold the impugned regime. LeBel J. gave the 
leading, neoliberal judgment in Quebec v. A. and also concurred with 
the neoliberal majority in Walsh and Hodge, but gave the highly 
relational dissenting judgment in Miglin and concurred with the partly 
relational dissent in Hartshorne. How, if at all, can these discrepancies 
be reconciled? 
 
One possibility is that it takes longer for relational ideas to gain 
acceptance in some areas than others, and that the shift from neoliberal 
to relational perspectives occurred later in relation to marital property 
agreements than for spousal support agreements.210 These different 
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evolutionary timelines might be attributable to the different structural 
and policy considerations applying to each context, with courts more 
willing to uphold marital property agreements due to the parties’ 
stronger bargaining endowments. However, a similar ideological shift 
is not evident in the constitutional context, where the admittedly few 
cases referenced above suggest that the court has fluctuated from more 
relational perspectives in Miron to (largely) more neoliberal views in 
Walsh and Hodge, and arguably less neoliberal views in Quebec v. A., 
where the overall result contrasted with the relational perspectives 
espoused by the plurality of the court. Therefore, while there does not 
appear to be an overall movement towards more relational 
perspectives, it seems possible that different ideological approaches 
may predominate in particular policy contexts.  
 
A second possibility is that, as Brodie suggests,211 legal 
ideology is currently in a (prolonged) state of flux, and that relevant 
policy spaces are highly contested in the transitional period (as 
evidenced by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Quebec v. 
A.). The apparent inconsistencies also accord with Dobrowolsky’s 
reminder that neoliberalism is not immutable, and may be applied 
differently depending on the context and the actor.212  
 
A third possibility is that it is a false dichotomy to distinguish 
between marital property agreements and spousal support agreements. 
The real distinction may be between prenuptial and separation 
agreements, with the Court attaching greater weight to relational 
factors and pressures in the emotional context of marital breakdown. 
This might reconcile the approaches taken in Miglin and Rick (both 
concerning marital breakdown agreements) with that in Hartshorne (a 
prenuptial contract). However this interpretation seems inconsistent 
with the majority’s emphasis in Quebec v. A. on the frequently illusory 
nature of “choice” in the non-marital context. 
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Relational Autonomy in Practice  
 
Do relational understandings of choice and autonomy make any real 
difference in practice to spousal support and marital property 
agreement cases? Again, both categories are considered separately. 
 
Spousal support cases 
 
The Pelech trilogy was criticized for the court's assumption of free will 
and rational decision making.213 However, a broader conception of 
autonomy might not have made much difference, since it was not 
contended in any of the cases that the original agreements were 
involuntary or exploitative214 or that any of the wives lacked bargaining 
capacity. Although Shirley Pelech had a history of mental health 
problems, this was not raised to impugn the agreement. Nor was the 
quality of legal representation queried in any of the cases, a point 
particularly emphasized in Richardson, where the agreement seemed 
least fair.215 There, even the strong dissent of LaForest J. focused on the 
substantive fairness of the agreement rather than autonomy; that is, the 
question was whether fairness concerns should override an autonomous 
agreement, not whether the agreement was really autonomous. Although 
the majority and dissenting judicial narratives differed regarding Donna 
Richardson’s possible economic dependency and loss of human capital 
due to non-employment, both narratives addressed this issue in terms of 
the support objective of minimizing economic disadvantage arising from 
the marriage, and neither considered whether economic dependency might 
have affected Donna’s bargaining capacity. Hence, relational theory might 
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only have made a difference if the cases were framed differently, and the 
parties’ autonomy in respect of the original agreements was contested.216 
 
As to Miglin, this article has argued that both the majority and 
dissenting judgments are highly relational in their conceptualization of 
autonomy. Both emphasize the importance of context, including all the 
circumstances of the agreement, and the parties’ needs and concerns. 
Although the dissent went further than the majority in terms of 
relational analysis (for example, expanding greatly on the inherently 
gendered nature of bargaining inequalities and the fraught nature of 
separation negotiations), the majority also appeared fully alive to these 
issues. The question is therefore whether relational theory made, or 
could have made, any practical difference to the outcome. 
 
Although the conceptual analysis of autonomy was relational 
in each judgment, one might argue that the dissent’s narrative was more 
relational in practice. The dissent depicted Linda, the wife, as 
economically vulnerable and with little human capital, as she had not 
worked outside the family business for many years, whereas the 
majority felt that because she had worked, she should be employable. 
The dissent considered that Linda was prevented from working outside 
the home due to her increased childcare burden; the majority felt that 
she could have employed a baby-sitter, as she had done while married, 
irrespective of her changed circumstances. The dissent, but not the 
majority, also implicitly represented Eric, the husband, as 
controlling,217 though it did not explicitly consider whether this 
impacted on the negotiation process. Both judgments noted that Linda 
claimed to have felt pressured, confused, and emotional at the time of 
the agreement; while the dissent seemed inclined to give more credence 
to this than the majority, neither judgment actually ruled on this 
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issue.218 However, the tenor of the dissenting judgment suggests that, 
if pushed, the dissent would have found that the bargaining process was 
not unimpeachable, even with legal advice. The majority felt that there 
was no requirement to address the question of whether, given 
inadequate advice, Linda’s evidence of pressure would have been 
sufficient to demonstrate either vulnerability or exploitation for the 
purposes of the Act.219 This question therefore remains open.  
 
Both narratives therefore depend on contextual interpretation. 
The dissent highlights concerns identified in the feminist literature, and 
while its interpretation is arguably stereotypical and disempowering, it 
is also more relational in its deeper examination of context. 
Nevertheless, even if the majority had adopted a similar 
characterization, it might well still have considered that any 
vulnerabilities were counteracted by the high level of professional 
advice Linda received.220 Accordingly, a more relational analysis of the 
facts might have made little significant difference, once the majority 
had decided to eschew the dissent’s greater emphasis on objective 
fairness.  
 
A relational approach would have made little difference in 
L.M.P. or R.P. Once the majority of the Supreme Court had determined 
that spousal support could not be revisited under section 17 of the 
Divorce Act without evidence of a material change in circumstances, 
the autonomy of the parties in reaching the original agreement did not 
arise, as it was assumed that the agreement had been properly 
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scrutinized at the time of the order. However, even if the majority had 
concurred with the emphasis placed by Cromwell J. on the importance 
of agreements, it is hard to see how a relational approach could have 
led to a different outcome. In each case, the husband sought to reduce 
or terminate the support payable to the wife under a consent order, but 
there was no evidence that either husband was particularly vulnerable. 
By contrast, both wives were homemakers, so were presumably more 
economically vulnerable than their husbands, and the wife in L.M.P. 
also suffered from a serious disability. Accordingly, to the extent that 
any relational factors might potentially have applied, they could not 
have been used by the actual applicants to challenge the agreements. 
 
Marital property agreement cases 
 
Would a relational approach to autonomy have made a difference in 
Hartshorne? One problem here is that the case centred on the 
interpretation of fairness provisions rather than autonomy as such. 
Even the dissent (which took a more relational view of autonomy) 
emphasized that fairness under the British Columbia legislation must 
be evaluated at the time of the application. It followed that an 
agreement that was originally unfair or that was impeachable from an 
autonomy perspective could have become fair by the time of the 
hearing.221 Accordingly, the parties’ autonomy was something of a side 
issue, unless duress, unconscionability, or undue influence could be 
established to set the agreement aside altogether. However, this does 
not mean that autonomy was irrelevant. The majority stressed that the 
evaluation of fairness must incorporate the parties’ perspectives, as 
evidenced by the agreement. An agreement where either spouse’s 
autonomy can be impugned must necessarily carry less weight as 
evidence of his or her view of fairness. 
 
Although there are clear problems with the majority 
interpretation of autonomy in Hartshorne, does this mean that 
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Kathleen was not acting autonomously when she signed the 
agreement? This depends on how the case narrative is constructed, and 
at least two possible relational narratives present themselves in 
Hartshorne.  
 
In the first, Kathleen was a qualified lawyer who had practised 
for some years and had the benefit of legal advice before signing the 
agreement. She should have known that her entitlements under the 
prenuptial agreement were potentially less favourable than if she 
remained single.222 She was amenable to Robert retaining ownership 
of the assets he had acquired before marriage,223 though she was upset 
when the agreement he prepared went much further than this. Did she 
prioritize the marriage, even at a potential financial cost, because she 
wanted an “official” relationship, or had invested emotionally in the 
relationship to such a degree that marriage seemed necessary to her, or 
because she feared the embarrassment of cancelling the wedding at the 
last minute? If so, it is arguable that she made a voluntary and 
autonomous choice, based on a relational concern. Clearly, the 
agreement was not “mutual” or “voluntary” in the sense of being 
desired by Kathleen or of embodying her concerns or concept of 
fairness. However, many people enter agreements that do not accord 
with their personal preferences, and this does not necessarily mean that 
they are not acting autonomously. 
 
In the second relational narrative, Kathleen had the agreement 
sprung on her at short notice, immediately before her wedding, when 
she was particularly emotional. She was already economically 
vulnerable because she had left her job for family reasons and was 
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financially reliant on Robert. This should not be construed solely as 
“her” choice; Robert was involved in the decision as well, as he agreed 
to support the family. Because of her financial vulnerability, Kathleen 
had significantly less bargaining power than Robert, and she may have 
feared that the relationship would end if she did not sign. The 
emotional pressure and context and the economic disparity between the 
parties deprived Kathleen of realistic alternatives and also impaired her 
capacity to think clearly and make informed decisions.  
 
It is therefore possible to make relational arguments both for 
and against Kathleen’s autonomy, and Leckey is correct that much 
depends on the contextual application. In fact, the first narrative may 
be more persuasive. Shaffer has argued that it is not possible simply to 
“walk away” from a bad deal in a family or personal context, given the 
high degree of emotional investment in the relationship.224 However, 
there is no suggestion in the judgments that Robert was likely to end 
the relationship if Kathleen failed to sign the agreement. The explicit 
quid pro quo was that Kathleen must sign if she wished to marry 
Robert; implicitly, if she did not sign, the relationship would continue 
as before, on a cohabitational basis. As Kathleen had been divorced 
before, she must have known that marriage is not necessarily 
permanent or a greater guarantee of security than a non-marital 
relationship, although she obviously hoped otherwise. This suggests 
that Kathleen knew she had a viable alternative. Overall, a relational 
approach to autonomy could have made a difference in Hartshorne, 
even within the scope of the legislation, but it would depend on which 
relational narrative the court found more persuasive. 
 
The relational approach taken in Rick clearly did affect the 
outcome. Again, two potential narratives applied. The trial judge 
represented Nancy as emotionally vulnerable, a “deeply troubled 
person” with a flawed “perception of reality” due to “an unhealthy 
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condition of the mind.”225 Her understanding of the legal process was 
“misguided”226 and her thinking was “disordered.”227 Ben, her 
husband, was aware that she was vulnerable and deliberately exploited 
this. Although Nancy had occasional legal advice, it did not 
compensate for her vulnerability as she was unable to benefit from it. 
This narrative was accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada as being 
“amply supported by the evidence,”228 and was a significant factor in 
the court’s finding of unconscionability. The Court’s finding was also 
heavily premised on its acknowledgement of the emotional forces 
prevalent in the marital breakdown context, which justified lowering 
the standard for unconscionability.  
 
By contrast, the Court of Appeal had rejected the trial judge’s 
finding that Nancy’s mental instability affected her ability to 
comprehend the negotiations and the legal processes, holding that “she 
knew what she was doing” and that any vulnerability was counteracted 
by the availability of professional advice.229 Ben was not responsible 
for Nancy’s inability to benefit from advice and was entitled to the best 
deal he could get. This interpretation seems premised on an atomistic 
conception of the parties as individualists who were expected to do 
their best for themselves. Notional autonomy based on the availability 
of advice was therefore sufficient for the enforcement of agreements, 
even if the party receiving the advice was unable to benefit from it. The 
Court of Appeal did not emphasize the marital breakdown context, 
which might have encouraged a more nuanced evaluation of the 
pressures potentially affecting the parties.  
 
 
                                                 
 
225  Rick, supra note 11 at para 23, citing Slade J at trial. 
226  Ibid. 
227  Ibid at para 28, citing Slade J. 
228  Ibid at para 63. 
229  Ibid at para 29, citing the Court of Appeal (emphasis added). 







This article advocates a relational approach to family property and spousal 
support agreements. Feminists have identified serious flaws in the 
neoliberal conceptualization of autonomy; economic rationality and self-
interest do not necessarily guide personal decision making, and gendered 
bargaining disparities may arise from structural conditions. Social context 
and relations affect not only the development of personal decision-making 
capacities but also the quality and nature of personal choices. A relational 
approach to autonomy is more profound and realistic than the neoliberal 
paradigm and fits better with family relationships. It is also normatively 
preferable as it vindicates the importance of emotion and connection in the 
decision-making process.  
 
However, as this article emphasizes, relational theory does not 
mean that contracts will readily be set aside on emotional grounds. 
Relational theory recognizes that individuals may have non-economic 
priorities. Therefore, someone making an objectively “bad” agreement, 
even in emotional circumstances, may well be acting autonomously. Nor 
does relational theory mean setting agreements aside simply because one 
party was vulnerable.230 The agreement in Miglin was upheld, despite the 
majority’s relational approach to autonomy, since the high level of 
professional advice Linda received counteracted her vulnerability. Even in 
Rick, where the agreement was held to be unconscionable, the point was 
not merely that Nancy was vulnerable, but that her vulnerability was 
unfairly exploited. Accordingly, while vulnerability may undermine 
respect for agreements, it will not always do so. The crucial consideration 
is whether the individual has the freedom and capacity to consider her 
situation and feels that she has genuine alternatives in how she responds 
to it. Often, but not always, professional advice may play a significant role 
in ensuring the individual has such capacity. 
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Although relational theory is more realistic and nuanced in its 
conceptualization of autonomy than neoliberalism, this article argues that 
relational theory may not always make the degree of practical difference 
that many feminists might expect. The case law on marital property and 
spousal support agreements suggests two explanations for this. The first 
explanation lies in statutory fairness standards: where courts can intervene 
to rectify agreements that are considered objectively unfair, the issue of 
autonomy becomes less important. This is demonstrated by the dissent in 
Miglin, which prioritized objective fairness at the time of distribution over 
respect for the parties’ autonomy. Of course, this position may itself be 
strongly informed by relational concerns; the Miglin dissent was heavily 
influenced by the potential for unequal bargaining power and emotional 
confusion in the marital breakdown context, as well as structural gender 
equality concerns. However, the solution proposed by the dissent was to 
limit autonomy rather than to reconceive it. On the other hand, where the 
law emphasizes agreement, or “fairness” is interpreted in light of the 
parties’ stated or assumed preferences (as in Hartshorne), autonomy 
theory becomes more important; it is then essential to ensure that the 
parties were acting autonomously when they made the agreement that is 
relied on as indicative of their wishes. Even here, however, a relational 
view may make less difference than might be expected, since few of the 
cases analyzed for this article presented an autonomy argument where a 
relational approach might have had an effect. This may be because the 
established paradigm of autonomy, as well as the statutory framework, 
affects how cases are presented. As noted herein, some of the cases 
examined (particularly Richardson) might have been presented differently 
had there seemed any point in doing so.  
 
The second reason why relational theory may not always have the 
expected impact lies in the potential for different relational narratives. As 
this article emphasizes, a relational approach does not necessarily mean 
that the court will automatically overturn “bad” agreements since 
relational theory must accommodate agency and choice. Accordingly, 
much depends on the contextual analysis and the application of theory to 
the facts. As this article illustrates, the agreement in Hartshorne might still 
have been upheld under relational principles, depending on which factual 
narrative the court preferred.  





Nevertheless, this article also shows that relational autonomy 
theory can make a very significant difference in some cases. Courts taking 
a relational approach to autonomy may accord less weight to agreements 
or set them aside where they were tainted by exploitation or unfair 
pressure, where legal advice was inadequate to counteract vulnerability, or 
where procedures are questionable in some way that potentially 
undermines the quality of consent. This was most notably demonstrated in 
Rick, and might also have been demonstrated in Miglin, had the 
professional advice in that case been lacking, or in Hartshorne, had the 
court preferred a particular relational narrative. Accordingly, there are 
situations where a relational approach can prove vitally important. 
 
It is therefore a matter of deep concern that the Supreme Court of 
Canada should continue to espouse the relational approaches it has 
adopted in Miglin and Rick, in relation to both spousal support and marital 
property agreements. However, notwithstanding the decisions in both 
these cases, the Court’s overall approach seems inconsistent. This may be 
due to the different contexts in which particular agreements are made; it is 
notable that the Court’s repeated emphasis on the emotional turmoil 
involved in marital breakdown, and the resulting potential for 
vulnerability, has not been echoed in relation to prenuptial agreements. 
This difference may be attributable to a concern that prenuptial agreements 
might too easily be set aside, but as this article’s analysis of Hartshorne 
suggests, adopting a relational approach does not prevent a court from 
upholding agreements in appropriate circumstances.  
 
Alternatively, the apparent disparities in approach may arise from 
perceived structural and functional differences between spousal support 
and marital property division. Seen in this light, Hartshorne might be 
regarded as the norm in relation to marital property agreements, with Rick 
being viewed as something of an aberration, based on the extreme nature 
of its facts. If that is indeed the case, this article contends that it would be 
preferable to adopt a relational approach to marital property agreements, 
as well as spousal support agreements. Property division may be highly 
significant for addressing gender equality concerns, particularly given the 
discretionary nature of support, and the court may still consider structural 
bargaining endowments as part of its overall contextual analysis. 





A third possibility is that the variable approaches to marital 
property and spousal support agreements simply reflect the broader legal 
debate in Canada on autonomy concerns. It is clear from decisions in 
related areas, such as the recent decision in Quebec v. A., that autonomy 
theory is part of a highly contested and divisive discussion on freedom, 
equality, and personal responsibility, which is linked to an ongoing 
ideological struggle arising from the growth of neoliberalism. The strong 
neoliberal tone of many recent judgments (notably those in Walsh, Hodge, 
Hawthorne, and (partly) Quebec v. A.), demonstrates that the shift to more 
relational values evident in Miglin and Rick is by no means conclusive, 
particularly as judges have adopted contrasting approaches in different 
cases. Given the intensity of the debate, it is to be hoped that the Supreme 
Court of Canada does not regress from its adoption of relational theory 
and continues to apply relational understandings to marital agreements.
